Jama v. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

What Happened

Jama involved an immigration statute, not § 1983. The question was whether the government could remove a noncitizen to a country without first getting that country’s advance acceptance under one part of the statute.

The statutory text required acceptance in some places, but not in the specific provision the government relied on.

What the Court Decided

The Supreme Court enforced the text as written.

The Court said that when Congress includes language in one section of a statute but leaves it out of another, courts should not casually assume the missing language still applies. In other words, if Congress wanted the extra requirement there too, Congress could have written it there.

What It Means in Practice

Jama matters here because it shows a different interpretive method from the one the Court often uses in § 1983 immunity cases.

In Jama, the Court did not say:

• maybe Congress silently meant to include an extra requirement
• maybe an old background rule should fill the gap

Instead, the Court treated the missing text as meaningful.

That is why Jama is useful in a textualist critique of § 1983 barriers. It shows the Court knows how to respect Congress’s choice not to include extra language when it wants to.

How You Can Use It

Use Jama to support a simple interpretive point:

• when Congress leaves language out, courts should be careful about putting it back in

That is especially helpful when criticizing immunity doctrines and other court-made barriers not written into § 1983.

How It Can Be Used Against You

Defendants will say Jama is not a § 1983 case and does not directly decide any immunity doctrine.

That is fair. Jama is not a holding about § 1983 liability. It is useful because it shows the Court using a more straightforward textual rule in another statutory setting, which makes the § 1983 cases look more like policy choice than inevitable interpretation.