Bostock v. Clayton County
590 U.S. 644 (2020)
Holding
When Congress writes a statute broadly, courts must apply the written words as enacted; firing someone for being gay or transgender is discrimination because of sex under Title VII.
What Happened
Gerald Bostock alleged he was fired because he was gay. His case was heard with two other employment-discrimination cases asking whether Title VII’s ban on discrimination “because of sex” reaches sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination.
What the Court Decided
The Supreme Court said yes.
Justice Gorsuch’s majority opinion treated the statutory text as controlling. The Court said that if an employer fires a man for being attracted to men but would not fire a woman for the same trait, sex is necessarily part of the decision.
What It Means in Practice
Bostock matters outside employment law because it is a modern example of the Court saying the written words control even when the result may go beyond what some people expected in the year of enactment.
That is why the case is useful in textualist arguments about § 1983. It shows the Court knows how to follow broad statutory language when it wants to.
How You Can Use It
Use Bostock when you want a modern statement of textualism from the current Court.
It is especially useful for the line that the written word is the law and people are entitled to its benefit.
How It Can Be Used Against You
Defendants will say Bostock involved Title VII, not § 1983, and does not directly decide any immunity question.
That is true. Its value here is methodological. It shows the Court using a textual approach that makes the court-made barriers in § 1983 stand out more sharply.